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SOLEM v. HELM: EXTENDING JUDICIAL





The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes the
infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments."' The language of the
amendment was borrowed directly from the Virginia Constitution of 1776,
which had employed the wording found in the English Bill of Rights of
1689.2 Consequently, there is sparse legislative history from which its
meaning may be ascertained.
Under the American interpretation, it was generally assumed by courts
and commentators that the cruel and unusual punishments clause was ad-
dressed solely to the mode or method of punishment imposed upon one
convicted of a crime.3 It was more than a century after the amendment's
adoption when the United States Supreme Court first recognized that pun-
ishments that were disproportionate in their severity to the crime commit-
ted might violate the cruel and unusual punishments clause.4 The Court
has applied a proportionality analysis to clearly unusual modes of punish-
ment 5 and, more recently, to sentences of death.6
Until 1980, however, the Court had never expressly determined whether
a term of imprisonment by its excessive length could violate principles of
proportionality and thereby trigger the proscriptions of the eighth amend-
I. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
2. See Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 425 (2d Cir. 1978) (Appendix, The Origin and
Meaning of the Eight Amendment).
3. United States v. Weems, 217 U.S. 349, 368, 378 (1910). The Weems Court noted
that although the scope of the clause had never been clearly defined, the amendment could
be interpreted to proscribe, at a minimum, torturous and barbarous punishments. Id at 368.
See generaly Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The Original Mean-
ing, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969).
4. United States v. Weems, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
5. Id., see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
6. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); see infra note
43. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion); see infra notes 44-52 and
accompanying text.
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ment. In Rummel v. Estelle,7 the Court rejected the argument that the im-
position of a life sentence on a third time offender violated principles of
proportionality and thus abridged eighth amendment guarantees.8 The
Court deferred to the judgment of state legislators on the appropriateness
of prison terms to particular offenses.9 Because the Court appeared to
premise its holding on the rationale that the death penalty is different in
kind from other forms of punishment,' ° it appeared following Rummel
that, except in extreme circumstances, proportionality analysis would nec-
essarily be limited to capital cases.
In Solem v. Helm," decided only three years after Rummel, the
Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision applied the proportionality prin-
ciple to circumstances remarkably similar to those before the Court in
Rummel. Helm was convicted under a recidivist statute and sentenced to
life imprisonment without possibility of parole. As in Rummel, none of
Helm's six prior felony convictions involved violent crimes. 2 Justice Pow-
ell, who wrote for the dissent inRummel, wrote for the majority in Solem v.
Helm. He distinguished the two cases by emphasizing that Helm's sen-
tence precluded all possibility of parole, while Rummel would be eligible
for parole in approximately twelve years.' 3
This note will examine the majority and dissenting opinions in Solem v.
Helm, comparing them with prior Supreme Court and lower court rulings.
It will discuss the proportionality principle as it has evolved in eighth
amendment jurisprudence and demonstrate that, although the rationale in
Helm is just and finds support in prior Supreme Court decisions, it cannot
rationally be reconciled with Rummel v. Estelle. Despite its broad lan-
guage, the Helm decision does not clarify the approach to be followed in
future eighth amendment cases. The opinion leaves open the question of
whether the proportionality test applied in Helm is applicable to all
sentences of imprisonment or only to terms of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. Although the opinion suggests that where a review of
7. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
8. Rummel was convicted under a Texas recidivist statute which provided that
"[w]hoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than capital shall on such
third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary." 445 U.S. at 264. The statute
itself had been previously upheld as constitutional in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
Rummel sought only to challenge the statute's application to his case as cruel and unusual.
9. 445 U.S. at 274, 284-85. See infra note 118.
10. 445 U.S. at 272. See infra notes 129-60 and accompanying text.
11. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
12. Id. at 3012-13; but see id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice main-
tained that Helm's crimes had the potential for violence.
13. Id. at 3015-16.
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proportionality is mandated, extended judicial review will not be required
in all cases, the Court does not promulgate adequate standards for deter-
mining when the three-part proportionality test articulated in Helm is
properly invoked.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
A. Historical Justification
Because the language of the eighth amendment is derived from the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights of 1689, the amendment is presumed to afford the indi-
vidual at least those protections embodied in its English counterpart.' 4 It
is widely believed that at the time of its adoption the framers of the United
States Constitution intended primarily to prohibit punishments that were
cruel in their method, rather than excessive in relation to the crime.' 5
American courts virtually ignored the cruel and unusual punishments
clause for nearly 100 years.' 6 United States v. Weems 7 was the first
United States Supreme Court decision to articulate the notion that the
eighth amendment required a penalty to be in proportion to the crime for
14. Id. at 3007 n. 10 and accompanying text. The Helm Court noted that historical com-
mentators have maintained that the American colonists sought guarantees that would pro-
tect the same liberties enjoyed by English citizens. The Court contended that it was "a
longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of
its excessive length or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged" (quoting R.
PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236 (1959)). Id. at 3007.
15. Granucci, supra note 3, at 842. The author maintains, however, that this limited
interpretation of the English law was manifestly incorrect. He stated
a fresh look at the history of punishment in England, and especially the framing of
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, indicates that the framers [of the American
Constitution] themselves seriously misinterpreted English law. Not only had Great
Britain developed, prior to 1689, a general policy against excessiveness in punish-
ments, but it did not prohibit "barbarous" punishments that were proportionate to
an offense.
Id. at 843-44. See Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment- An
Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24
BUFF. L. REV. 783 (1975). The authors contend the American framers did, in fact, recognize
that the cruel and unusual punishments clause barred disproportionate penalties and that
the American judiciary misread their intent. Id. at 831. They note that Thomas Jefferson's
letters support a finding that the framers intended to prohibit disproportionately severe pun-
ishments. These letters, they maintain, constitute "an American reference which recognized
that both the mode of punishment and the duration of it must be proportioned to the crime
in order that the penalty be just and legitimate." 1d. at 818.
16. Cf. Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 409-10, 32 N.E. 1019, 1020-21 (1893); Granucci,
supra note 3, at 842 ("Attempts to extend the meaning of the clause to cover any punishment
disproportionate to the crime were rebuffed throughout the nineteenth century and com-
mentators believed the clause to be obsolete.").
17. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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which it was imposed.' 8
The Weems case involved peculiar facts. The case arose under the Phil-
ippine Bill of Rights, which had incorporated certain provisions of the
United States Constitution, among them the language of the eighth
amendment.' 9 Weems had been convicted of falsifying an official docu-
ment, and, pursuant to Phillipine law, the penalty of "cadena temporal"
was imposed.2" This punishment included imprisonment for a term of ten
to twenty years, at hard and "painful" labor, chained by the wrists and
ankles.2' In addition, various civil disabilities attached that remained in
force throughout the offender's lifetime.22 Because the Court determined
the punishment to be inherently cruel and alien to Anglo-Saxon law, it did
not rely exclusively on a proportionality theory in order to find an eighth
amendment violation.23 The Court maintained, however, that although it
had not previously determined the exact scope of the cruel and unusual
punishments clause, included within its ambit was the requirement that the
punishment be proportionate to the crime committed.24 In determining
18. The principle of proportionality had been advanced previously by Justice Field,
dissenting in O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). In O'Neill, the defendant was con-
victed for selling liquor in Vermont (a dry state) 307 times, and each sale was deemed an
individual offense for which a separate penalty was imposed. The defendant was fined $20
per offense, and if the judgment was not satisfied within a specified period of time, he was to
be jailed three days for every dollar of the total fine. The cumulative sentence amounted to
approximately 54 years of confinement. The majority, perceiving no federal question before
the Court, dismissed the case. Justice Field, however, in his dissent, squarely addressed the
eighth amendment issue, asserting that the amendment applied to the states as well as to the
federal government. He compared the penalty inflicted with punishment, prescribed
throughout the state for other, more serious crimes, noting that O'Neill's punishment was
"six times as great as any court in Vermont could have imposed for manslaughter, forgery,
or perjury," and that had O'Neill "been found guilty of... highway robbery, he would
have received less punishment." 144 U.S. at 339 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field con-
cluded that the cruel and unusual punishments clause "is directed, not only against [barba-
rous and torturous punishments] but against all punishments which by their excessive length
or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Id. at 339-40.
19. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
20. Id. at 363.
21. Id. at 364.
22. Id. at 364-65. The Court noted that the collateral penalties included "civil interdic-
tion," which deprived the person punished of "rights of parental authority, guardianship of
person or property, participation in the family council, marital authority, the administration
of property, and the right to dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos." The prisoner,
upon his release from confinement, would remain subject to the "penalty of perpetual dis-
qualification," which included "deprivation of office, even though it be held by popular
election, the deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected to public office, the disqualifica-
tion to acquire honors, etc., and the loss of retirement pay, etc." Id.
23. Id. at 365-66, 377.
24. Id. at 380-81. The Court adopted the rationale of Justice Field's dissent in O'Neill v.
Vermont. See supra note 18.
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whether Weems' sentence was proportionate to his crime, the Court em-
ployed a comparative analysis. It first compared "cadena temporal" with
punishments for similar offenses in the United States and other nations. It
then examined the penalties inflicted for more severe crimes in the Philip-
pines.25 Additionally, the Court examined the nature of the offense. The
crime committed by the petitioner was not one that posed a great threat to
society since it was nonviolent in nature.26 The Court concluded that the
offense committed did not warrant the infliction of the disproportionately
severe punishment, noting that "it is a precept of justice that punishment
for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense."2 7 While
conceding that normally "prominence is given to the power of the legisla-
ture to define crimes and their punishment,"28 the Court observed that
legislative action is clearly limited by the eighth amendment.29
The Weems decision was the first to recognize proportionality as a con-
stitutional requirement and to apply a comparative test to determine
whether a given penalty was excessive in relation to the offense.3" The
Court examined the nature of the crime, and compared the penalty in-
flicted with those imposed both in other jurisdictions for the same offense,
and in the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses.3 It held that the
punishment suffered by Weems was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment
and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. [The] punish-
ments come under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account
of their degree and their kind."3 2 In succeeding years, however, not all
American courts employed the Weems rationale in their analysis of issues
raised under the eighth amendment.33 In part this may have been because
the opinion was issued by a six member rather than a nine member
25. Id.
26. See Granucci, supra note 3, at 843. Weems' offense was wholly nonviolent in na-
ture. It involved merely the falsification of a public document.
27. 217 U.S. at 367. The Court observed that a Massachusetts court had recognized the
proportionality principle when it had acknowledged "the possibility that imprisonment in
the state prison for a long term of years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment." Id at 368 (quoting McDonald v. Common-
wealth, 173 Mass. 322 (1899)).
28. Id at 378.
29. Id Where legislative power encounters a constitutional limitation, it then becomes
the legal duty of the judiciary to review that power. Id at 378-79.
30. See Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119,
1119 (1979).
31. 217 U.S. at 380-81.
32. Id. at 377.
33. Some courts interpreted Weems narrowly and maintained that absent unusual ac-
cessory penalties, the Court would not have held Weems' sentence to be disproportionate.
See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 294 (1980). Other courts recognized in Weems a
1984]
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Court.
3 4
The next opportunity for the Court to expand its definition of the cruel
and unusual punishments clause arose fifty-two years after Weems in
Robinson v. California.3 In Robinson, a drug addict was convicted under
a statute that classified drug addiction as a misdemeanor, punishable by
imprisonment for ninety days to one year.36 Careful to avoid treading on
traditional state authority in the area of drug abuse, the Court stressed that
the status of being an addict was considered a criminal offense by the Cali-
fornia courts in their interpretation of the statute,37 and it was this manner
of applying the statute that the Court found objectionable. Because the
constitutional requirement that a punishment be proportionate to the offense. See, e.g., Hart
v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
34. See Comment, supra note 15, at 796 n.55. Thus, the Weems opinion was subscribed
to by only a four member "majority." At the time of argument there were seven members;
one died in the interim. Id The deceased member, Justice Brewer, was sympathetic to the
majority rationale, having joined the dissent in O'Neill. Granucci, supra note 3, at 843. The
Supreme Court's decision in Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), clouded the issue
of Weems' intended scope. Significantly, Justice Holmes, who joined the dissent in Weems,
wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. In Badders, a defendant challenged a sentence of
five years imprisonment on each of seven counts of mail fraud. Each count arose from the
mailing of a separate letter. Although the respective prison terms were to be served concur-
rently, the sentence also imposed a $1,000 fine for each offense, totaling $7,000. Id. at 393.
The Court barely acknowledged the eighth amendment challenge to the sentence, conclud-
ing that Congress has authority to regulate the mails "[a]nd there is no ground for declaring
the punishment unconstitutional." Id. at 394. The Court engaged in no proportionality
analysis at all. In part, this may have been because five year concurrent sentences do not
appear to be disproportionate in relation to the crimes involved. Badders may have contrib-
uted to the confusion that resulted in the split of authority among later courts. Some courts
have since held that the Constitution requires that punishments may not be excessive in
relation to the crime, see infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text; others have adhered to
the view that the cruel and unusual punishments clause addresses only those punishments
cruel, torturous, or barbarous in the method in which they are inflicted; see infra notes 76-85
and accompanying text.
35. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In the intervening years, the Supreme Court did, however,
keep the proportionality principle alive in dicta. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plu-
rality opinion), petitioner lost his American citizenship for desertion during wartime. Be-
cause desertion under these circumstances was punishable by death and the petitioner had
received the lesser penalty of denationalization, the Court maintained that he was precluded
from raising the argument that his punishment was excessive in comparison to the nature of
his offense. Id. at 99. Instead, the Court looked to "the principle of civilized treatment
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment." Id. It employed a comparative analysis noting that
very few nations utilized denationalization as a punishment for any crime. Id at 102. In
holding that the punishment was by its very nature cruel, the Court postulated that "the
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101. The Court rejected a static interpretation of the
amendment's inhibitions, preferring to leave open the approach to be followed in future
eighth amendment adjudication.
36. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 n.l (1962).
37. The Court observed that it would be possible to construe the statute so as to demand
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statute was construed as imposing criminal status without requiring crimi-
nal intent or the commission of an overt act, the Court found imprison-
ment to be cruel and unusual.3" It emphasized proportionality concepts
when it reasoned that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract,
a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be
considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for a crime of having a common cold."3 9 In a concur-
ring opinion, Justice Douglas noted that a disproportionate criminal pen-
alty may invoke the ban against cruel and unusual punishments.'  The
Robinson Court thus expressly based its reasoning on the cruel and unu-
sual punishments clause, 4' further entrenching in eighth amendment juris-
prudence the principle that the punishment must fit the crime. 2
Subsequent to Robinson, the Supreme Court addressed a series of eighth
amendment challenges involving the death penalty. 3 In these cases the
some act, and thus avoid imposing a criminal sanction for the "status" of being addicted to
drugs. Id at 665.
38. Id. at 664, 666.
39. Id at 667.
40. Id. at 676.
41. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 15, at 802. Some commentators suggest that the
Robinson decision was improperly decided on eighth amendment grounds. See Comment,
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (1964). The author speculates
that
Robinson v. Caifornia may have established in the eighth amendment a basis for
invalidating legislation that is thought inappropriately to invoke the criminal sanc-
tion, despite an entire lack of precedent for the idea that a punishment may be
deemed cruel not because of its mode or even its proportionality but because the
conduct for which it is imposed should not be subjected to the criminal sanction.
Id. at 1071.
42. Moreover, Robinson affirmatively established the application of the cruel and unu-
sual punishments clause to the states. 370 U.S. at 675.
43. The first case was Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, Georgia's
capital punishment statute was attacked on essentially procedural grounds. The decision
was made up of five separate opinions in support of the judgment, which reversed the pen-
alty of death. Four Justices dissented. The Court invalidated the statute because it vested in
the jury virtually unlimited discretion to decide whether to impose death for certain crimes.
See Comment, supra note 15, at 805-06. It was therefore primarily the procedure followed
in arriving at the death penalty that was at issue in Furman.
The various Furman opinions further developed the comparative approach to analyzing
proportionality that would later be discussed fully in Solem v. Helm. Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion focused on "objective indicators from which a court can conclude that con-
temporary society considers a severe punishment unacceptable." 408 U.S. at 278 (Brennan,
J., concurring). To avoid blurring the line between judicial and legislative prerogative, Jus-
tice White, in his concurring opinion, commented that
judicial review, by definition, often involves a conffict between judicial and legisla-
tive judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires. In this respect, the
Eighth Amendment cases come to us in no different posture. It seems conceded by
all that the Amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the
1984]
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Court undertook an extensive review of capital punishment statutes apply-
ing eighth amendment principles. In Coker v. Georgia,' a plurality of the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of proportionality as inherent in
eighth amendment analysis.4' The Court expressly struck down a death
sentence as being disproportionate, and thus "cruel and unusual" in na-
ture.46 The question before the Court was whether a death sentence was
an excessive penalty for a conviction of rape, and therefore forbidden by
the cruel and unusual punishments clause.47 The Court examined histori-
cal and objective evidence4" in an effort to avoid the danger of deciding
constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the amend-
ment would bar whether legislatively approved or not.
Id at 313-14. The Justices declined to decide whether the death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment per se. The Court resolved this question four years later in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Gregg, a habeas petitioner advanced the
argument that death was invariably cruel and unusual punishment and therefore it could
never be imposed constitutionally. The Court disagreed, and held that death could be an
appropriate penalty for certain serious offenses. The applicable statute was the same one
considered in Furman. It had been revised by the Georgia legislature, however, to comport
with the directives of that decision. Id. at 153. The Court reviewed the history of the eighth
amendment, observing that "it has not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth
Amendment to 'barbarous' methods that were generally outlawed in the eighteenth century.
Instead, the Amendment has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner." The
Gregg Court noted that in Weems, the Court focused on the disproportionately severe pun-
ishment. Id at 171. Reasoning that "contemporary values" were determinative in applying
any proportionality test under the eighth amendment, the majority opinion emphasized "this
assessment does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather, that we look to objec-
tive indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction . . . the punishment must
not be 'excessive.'" Id. at 173.
The Gregg opinion evinced an awareness by the Court of the expanded role of judicial
review in capital punishment cases, and, indeed, in eighth amendment adjudication in gen-
eral. The Court, attempting to preserve traditional notions of federalism, stressed the impor-
tance of state legislative judgments on penalties for criminal activity and the deference that
ordinarily should be afforded those judgments. Moreover, the Court recognized that an
eighth amendment challenge must meet a heavy burden, and sentences would not frequently
be overturned as cruel and unusual. Id at 175. Nevertheless, the Court justified its author-
ity and the broader ambit of the eighth amendment when it noted that "legislative judgment
alone cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment standards since that amendment was
intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative power." Id at 174 n. 19.
44. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
45. Justice White, writing for the plurality, was joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
and Stevens. Justices Brennan and Marshall filed separate concurring opinions, and Justice
Powell filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Burger filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
46. 433 U.S. at 592 n.4.
47. 1d. at 592. The Court pointed out that "under Gregg, a punishment is 'excessive'
and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of pun-
ishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id
48. Id. at 593.
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eighth amendment violations on the basis of subjective values. 49 Accord-
ingly, the Court inquired into the nature of the crime, the punishment im-
posed in other jurisdictions for rape, and the penalties available in the
same jurisdiction for other offenses.5" Additionally, the Court examined
the frequency with which juries actually imposed the death penalty when it
was available, as indicia of "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."'" In concluding that the death penalty for
the crime of rape was disproportionate and violated the cruel and unusual
punishments clause, the Court impliedly counseled caution when it recog-
nized that the death penalty "is unique in its severity and irrevocability."52
The Coker Court did not address whether proportionality principles
could be properly applied to cases involving sentences of imprisonment.
The Court's emphasis on the unique nature of the death penalty, however,
could be interpreted as limiting the application of proportionality analysis
only to capital cases. While some courts subsequently adopted this view,
lower court response was by no means uniform.
49. Id at 592. The Court cautioned that "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be,
or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices. Judgment should be
informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent."
50. Id. at 593-600.
51. Id. at 596. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also
supra note 35.
52. 433 U.S. at 598 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 165-66). In a dissenting
opinion, Chief Justice Burger contended that the Court was "overstepp[ing] the bounds of
proper constitutional adjudication by substituting its policy judgment for that of the state
legislature." 433 U.S. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the
Helm dissent, thus reiterated the conflict that historically had characterized eighth amend-
ment jurisprudence.
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), is a further illustration of this ideological split.
In Enmund, the Court held the death penalty to be unconsitutionally disproportionate for
felony murder, where the petitioner "neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to
take life." Id. at 787, 801. The Court employed a comparative proportionality analysis, and
although "current legislative judgment" was inconclusive, determined that capital punish-
ment was excessive for felony murder. Id at 793. The petitioner's lack of intent to kill was
significant in the Court's evaluation of the nature of the crime and of the criminal. The
Enmund dissent addressed the potential for interjecting subjective values of judges that in-
hered in the Court's rule, and maintained that the petitioner "failed to show that contempo-
rary standards, as reflected in both jury determinations and legislative enactments, preclude
imposition of the death penalty for accomplice felony murder." Id. at 826 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, the dissent understood the holding to raise "intent to kill" to the
level of a constitutional requirement for the imposition of the death penalty, and maintained
that by superseding state judgment, the holding violated the constitutionally mandated sepa-
ration of powers in our federal system. Id at 802.
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B. Lower Court Decisions. Conflicting Interpretations of Supreme Court
Precedent in Applying Proportionality Princples
One commentator has suggested that "[t]he clear constitutional accept-
ance of the principle of proportionality should not be mistaken for cer-
tainty as to its content., 53 These words find support in lower court
decisions which have vacillated widely in their interpretation of the mean-
ing and scope of proportionality principles. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Rummel v. Estelle, some courts restricted proportionality analy-
sis to instances where the punishment imposed is attacked as either cruel in
its method, or irrevocable and thus different in kind, such as capital pun-
ishment.54 Other courts have applied a proportionality analysis to
sentences of imprisonment, and have held that a punishment may be
found to be cruel and unusual solely on the basis of excessive length.55
1. An Expansive View of the Proportionality Princple
The first significant federal court decision to extend the proportionality
rationale to a term of years in prison was Hart v. Coiner.56 The petitioner
in Hart was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to a West Virginia
recidivist statute. 7 He did not contest the constitutional validity of the
statute itself;58 rather he maintained that the sentence as applied to his case
was grossly disproportionate to the underlying offenses and, therefore,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.5 9 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted Supreme Court decisions under
the eighth amendment broadly, as advocating a flexible approach to a de-
53. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal
Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1378 (1975).
54. See, e.g., Anthony v. United States, 331 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1964); Smith v. United
States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S 846 (1960); Goodloe v. Parratt, 453 F.
Supp. 1380 (1978), rev'don other grounds, 605 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1979). See infra notes 76-
85 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423
U.S. 993 (1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974). See infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
56. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973).
57. The statute imposed a mandatory life sentence for "anyone who has been convicted
three separate times of offenses punishable by confinement in a penitentiary." Id. at 138.
Hart's three convictions consisted of writing a $50 check on insufficient funds in 1949, trans-
porting forged checks totalling $140 across state lines in 1955, and perjury. Id
58. Id. at 139. Some courts hold that a challenge to a sentence necessarily attacks the
statute itself, assuming the law is valid and the penalty is within the maximum specified.
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 578 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1978); Downey v. Perini, 518
F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacatedon other grounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); United States v. Dawson,
400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969).
59. 483 F.2d at 139.
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termination whether particular punishments were cruel and unusual.6" In
the Fourth Circuit's view, the eighth amendment, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, impliedly included sentences of imprisonment within its
prohibition.6' The fact that the statute involved in Hart was a recidivist
statute did not alter the court's approach. Although the analysis was com-
plicated by Hart's status as an habitual offender, the court reasoned that
the punishment must nevertheless bear some reasonable relationship to the
gravity of the underlying offenses.62
Thus, the Hart court adopted a proportionality analysis and developed a
four-part test comprised of "objective factors" to be weighed in the assess-
ment of proportionality. First, the court analyzed the nature of the offense,
which necessitated a consideration of the "element of violence and danger
to the person."63 Hart's three convictions were essentially nonviolent
property offenses, and the court therefore found them to be relatively mi-
nor.' Second, the court examined the legislative goals sought to be
achieved by the statute.65 Although the court found that the statute ac-
complished a legitimate purpose in deterring repeat offenders, it noted that
this goal could be served by a less severe punishment that took into consid-
eration the gravity of the underlying crimes.6 6 Third, the court compared
the punishments available in other jurisdictions for a similar offense with
the penalty imposed upon the petitioner and found that only three other
states mandated life imprisonment after three nonviolent felony convic-
tions.67 Lastly, the court examined punishments imposed in the same ju-
risdiction for more serious crimes and determined that life imprisonment
was reserved for the most serious offenses.6" Application of these objective
criteria revealed "irrationally disparate treatment" 69 of the petitioner, and
thus the Fourth Circuit held that the sentence violated the cruel and unu-
sual punishments clause.70
60. Id at 139-40. The court read the Weems opinion as recognizing the possibility that
a prison sentence "for a long term of years might be so disproportionate" that it would
violate the eighth amendment (quoting United States v. Weems, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910)).
61. Id
62. Id. at 142.
63. Id. at 140.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 141.
66. The Court stated that "[a]ssuming the validity of the deterrent theory, and there is
room for doubt, then if a life sentence is good for the purpose, surely a sentence of death
would be better." Id. (footnote omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 142.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 143. The Fourth Circuit, in a decision subsequent to Hart, sought to limit the
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the
Hart analysis in Downey v. Perini.7' The court in Downey held that ten- to
twenty-year prison sentences were disproportionate in relation to convic-
tions for possession and sale of marijuana and thus violated the eighth
amendment. 2 It concluded that a proportionality analysis, similar to the
one applied by the Fourth Circuit in Hart, was required by the reasoning,
if not the holdings, of earlier Supreme Court opinions73 as well as prior
Sixth Circuit cases.7' The court stated specifically that "a sentence which
is disproportionate to the crime for which it is administered may be held to
violate the Eighth Amendment solely because of the length of imprison-
ment imposed. ' 75
2. A Restrictive View of the Role of the Judiciary
Other federal courts have adopted a narrower interpretation of the cruel
and unusual punishments clause. Smith v. United States,76 decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, illustrates the defer-
application of proportionality analysis to cases where the crimes were relatively nonviolent
in nature. In Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975),
Griffin, a habeas petitioner, argued that the Hart decision required a reversal of his life
sentence, imposed pursuant to West Virginia's Habitual Offender Act. Id. at 757. Griffin
had previously been convicted for breaking and entering, and for burglary. His principal
offense was grand larceny. Id Because his underlying offenses posed a threat of danger to
persons and property, the court concluded that Hart did not mandate granting a writ of
habeas corpus. Id The Griffin opinion illustrates a cautious approach in reviewing claims
of disproportionate prison sentences and provides some evidence of judicial competence and
willingness to overturn only those sentences that exceed the clear bounds of constitutional
limitations. See Carmona v. Ward, 676 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 109
(1979); see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
71. 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacatedon other grounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
72. Id at 1292.
73. Id at 1290. The court determined that a review of Supreme Court cases, including
Weems, Furman, and Trop, revealed that the cruel and unusual punishments clause did "not
have a rigid and immutable meaning." Id Additionally, the court observed that prior to
Weems, the Supreme Court had, in Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903), addressed an
eighth amendment challenge based on the length of a prison sentence but had decided the
sentence was not cruel and unusual. Id
74. See Hermans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801
(1947) ("long-term imprisonment could be so disproportionate to the offense as to fall within
the inhibition of the cruel and unusual punishments clause").
75. Id For examples of state cases following a proportionality principle in sentencing,
see Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 1981) (construing a state constitu-
tion which expressly requires proportionality, the court found a life sentence constitutionally
invalid where a recidivist had committed three nonviolent property offenses); State v. Lee,
558 P.2d 236 (Wash. 1976) (life sentence for robbery not cruel and unusual punishment
where defendant had several prior violent felony convictions); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921
(Cal. 1972) (life sentence for second offense of indecent exposure is cruel and unusual).
76. 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960).
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ence to legislative prerogative stressed by those courts following the nar-
row view. The facts in Smith were very similar to those before the Sixth
Circuit in Downey. The defendant, a first offender, was incarcerated under
a fifty-two-year prison sentence for several counts of possession and sale of
marijuana and heroin.77 The court recognized that the sentence was un-
usually severe but refused to hold that it was cruel and unusual, since
"under the federal practice, appellate courts are without power to control
or modify a sentence which is within the limits fixed by a valid statute. 78
The Smith court's rationale has been followed in other jurisdictions as
well. In large part these courts have concluded that the cruel and unusual
punishments clause is directed primarily to the methods of punishment
imposed. A term of imprisonment, therefore, as long as it is within statu-
tory limits, generally has not been considered cruel and unusual. 79 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adhered to this nar-
row reading inAnthony v. United States.8° The court held that two consec-
utive twenty-year prison sentences, imposed for convictions of two sales of
marijuana, were not cruel and unusual.8 The Ninth Circuit focused on
the method of punishment when it noted that fines and imprisonment were
customary penalties for crime in the United States.82 In addressing the
appellant's claim that his sentences were disproportionate in length, the
court agreed that the punishment was severe, but refused to disturb the
sentence because it fell within the statutorily prescribed maximum.8 3 It
maintained that any defects in the statutory scheme should be remedied by
the state legislature or Congress, not by the judiciary. 4
The courts that followed the narrow view have thus generally refused to
apply proportionality principles to eighth amendment claims. While the
Supreme Court's treatment of the death penalty cases has led some lower
courts to employ a proportionality test in capital cases, the courts following
77. Id. at 464.
78. Id. at 467. The dissent in Smith contended that although a sentence within the
statutory limits will not ordinarily be modified on appeal, the appellate court is not without
the power to do so when injustice would otherwise result. Id at 469.
79. See Rener v. Beto, 447 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1971), (A 30-year sentence for second
offense marijuana possession was held to be constitutionally valid because it was within the
statutory limits. The Court found it unnecessary to engage in proportionality analysis), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). In Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978) (panel
decision); 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), however, the Fifth Circuit did employ a
proportionality analysis. See infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
80. 331 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1964).
81. Id at 693.
82. Id
83. Id at 694.
84. Id
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the restrictive approach have declined to extend that rationale to terms of
imprisonment.85
3. The Middle Course. A Cautious Application of the Expansive View
The majority of federal courts have recognized that proportionality
analysis is appropriate in certain circumstances. Some courts have ex-
tended proportionality review to cases involving prison sentences but have
limited its application to avoid extended analysis of all eighth amendment
claims.8 6 In United States v. Wardlaw,8 7 appellants were convicted of pos-
session and importation of cocaine," and were sentenced to two concur-
rent ten-year terms in prison.8 9 While the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit recognized that proportionality analysis could be ap-
propriately applied to prison sentences,9" the court maintained that the de-
fendants' sentences were not grossly disproportionate to the offenses in
light of the large quantity of drugs involved. 9'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized
the proportionality principle in Carmona v. Ward,9 2 but attempted to limit
its application. In Carmona, two habeas corpus petitioners challenged
their indeterminate prison sentences imposed for cocaine trafficking con-
victions. They were serving sentences of four years to life and six years to
life. 93 The Second Circuit acknowledged a trend among courts to apply
proportionality principles in cruel and unusual punishment cases.9" The
court cautioned that excluding capital punishment cases, Supreme Court
85. For a narrow view of the role of the judiciary in reviewing criminal sentences, see
Goodloe v. Parratt, 453 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Neb. 1978). There, the Court rejected a propor-
tionality test as inappropriate in all but capital punishment cases. Id at 1387. Goodloe, a
habeas petitioner, was sentenced to 10- to 15-year concurrent sentences following his convic-
tion for reckless driving and attempting to avoid arrest. Id. at 1382. The court determined
that proportionality analysis was "uniquely applicable to the sentence of death." Id. at
1387. While Smith and Anthony did not address appropriate review of a death sentence,
those cases notably were decided before the United States Supreme Court first tackled the
many facets of the death penalty problem presented in the Georgia capital cases. See supra
notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., discussion of Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1975), supra note
70.
87. 576 F.2d 932 (1st Cir. 1978).
88. Id. at 932.
89. Id at 937.
90. Id. The court noted that in Downey and Hart prison sentences had been found to
be cruel and unusual. The court also cited Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va.
1977). See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
91. The defendants possessed more than 6 lbs of cocaine. 576 F.2d at 937.
92. 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 109 (1979).
93. Id. at 406-07.
94. Id. at 408.
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decisions such as Weems, Robinson, and Trop, which employed a propor-
tionality test, involved elements of cruelty.95 Nonetheless, the court noted
that "a severe sentence imposed for a minor offense, could, solely because
of its length, be cruel and unusual punishment."96 The Carmona court
stressed the deference owed state legislatures in setting penalties, particu-
larly where, as here, drug offenses were involved. 97 The Second Circuit
took this deference into account when it employed a three-pronged pro-
portionality test which examined the nature of the offense, the punish-
ments imposed in New York for more serious offenses, and punishments
meted out in other jurisdictions for the same crime. 98 Taking into consid-
eration the possibility of parole afforded those sentenced to life imprison-
ment, the court determined that the sentences imposed did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.99
It is evident that the lower federal courts were sharply divided on
whether proportionality principles governed all forms of punishment, or
just the death penalty."°° A few courts extended proportionality principles
to cases arising under the eighth amendment involving excessive prison
sentences.'' Other courts, such as the Tenth Circuit in Smith, refused to
employ a proportionality test and deferred to the judgment of state legisla-
tures. ' 2 Still other courts understood the Supreme Court to advocate the
notion that proportionality principles inhered in eighth amendment analy-
sis but sought to restrict the instances in which a comparative proportion-
ality test would be invoked. °3 Finally, in 1980, the United States
Supreme Court, seeking to resolve conflicting lower court views concern-
ing proportionality principles, issued its decision in Rummel v. Estelle.'4
95. Id.
96. Id. at 409.
97. Id at 410. The New York legislature had enacted a relatively strict law in response
to the severe drug problems experienced by the state. The Court observed that over half of
the drug addicts in the United States reside in New York City. Id at 412, 415.
98. Id. at 410-15.
99. Id. at 414. The court placed a great deal of weight on the seriousness of the peti-
tioners' offenses. It noted that the "legislature could reasonably have found that drug traf-
ficking is a generator of collateral crime, even violent crime [and] is a grave offense of the
highest rank." Id. at 411.
100. Many courts relied on the same Supreme Court precedent yet arrived at different
conclusions. Most courts refer to Weems, Trop, Robinson, and the death penalty cases.
Those courts refusing to apply a proportionality test have often relied on Badders v. United
States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), see supra note 34; and Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616
(1912), see infra note 123.
101. See supra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
104. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
C Rummel and Its Progeny: An Attempt to Limit Increasing Judicial
Activism and Accommodate Principles of Federalism
1. The Rummel Decision. Deference to Legislative Judgment
Rummel v. Estelle rejected the notion that a prison sentence, excessive in
its term of years to the gravity of the underlying offense, constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. The decision expressly stated that, except in ex-
tremely rare cases, federal courts should not question whether a given pun-
ishment is excessive in relation to the offense.105 According to the Rummel
Court, such analysis is properly left to state legislative bodies, which have
superior ability to assess local policies and individual circumstances and
thus set criminal penalties accordingly.' °6
William Rummel was convicted and sentenced under a Texas recidivist
statute that compelled the imposition of a life sentence upon an individual
convicted of a third felony." 7 Under the Texas statute, Rummel was eligi-
ble for parole in approximately twelve years. 10 8 Rummel's two prior of-
fenses included fraudulent use of a credit card, which yielded him $80
worth of goods, and passing a forged check for $28.36. i09 Rummel's most
recent offense consisted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.' "o All of
these crimes were felony offenses at the time of Rummel's conviction. 1"
Rummel petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, urging that his sentence
was grossly disproportionate to his offenses." l2  The United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, 1 3 affirmed
the Fifth Circuit's denial of the writ and held that the sentence did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.' "'
The Court first distinguished the earlier death penalty cases from the
factual issues presented by Rummel, contending that because the death
penalty was qualitatively different from life imprisonment, the rationale
employed in the capital punishment cases was of minimal assistance in
105. The Court noted that "[tihis is not to say that a proportionality principle would not
come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent . . . if a legislature made
overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." Id. at 274 n.l I.
106. Id. at 284.
107. Id. at 264; see also supra note 8.
108. Id at 267.
109. Id at 265-66.
110. Id. at 266.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 267.
113. Rummel was a 5-4 decision. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 285.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented. Id.
114. Id at 285.
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determining the constitutionality of Rummel's sentence. 1"' The Court
then discussed the proportionality concept as it had been applied in its
previous decisions. The Court distinguished Weems by maintaining that
the rationale of the Weems Court could not be isolated from the peculiar
facts of that case."I6 It dismissed Rummel's argument that the Weems ra-
tionale might be extended to support a determination that prison sentences
could violate eighth amendment proscriptions on the basis of length
alone."' 7 The Rummel Court reasoned that the collateral civil disabilities
that attended the prison sentence in Weems were inextricably tied to the
Court's rationale and holding in that case." 8
The Court evaluated, and rejected as unworkable, Rummel's proposed
test.' In the Court's view, parole eligibility complicated an objective
analysis of Rummel's punishment. While it conceded that there is no en-
forceable right to early release, the Court concluded that the possibility
could not be totally ignored in assessing the severity of Rummel's sen-
tence. 20 Focusing on the gravity of Rummel's offense, the majority main-
tained that the recidivist statute further enhanced the difficulty of
115. Id. at 272.
116. Id. at 273.
117. Id. at 273-74. Rummel argued that the lengthy prison sentence alone provided a
basis for the Weems Court's finding that Weems' punishment was disproportionate. He also
found support for his claim in the death penalty cases in which the Court employed a pro-
portionality test. Moreover, Rummel argued that the nonviolent nature of his offenses and
the small amounts of money involved were material factors. He urged the Court to employ
these objective criteria to assess proportionality. Id. at 272-76.
118. Id. at 273-74. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The Court maintained
that
[g]iven the unique nature of the punishments considered in Weems and in the
death penalty cases, one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision
of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that
is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the
length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.
445 U.S. at 274. Justice Rehnquist emphasized that, in Badders, the Court, only a few short
years after deciding Weems, found no basis for even addressing the eighth amendment claim
raised. See supra note 34. The Badders decision, in Rehnquist's view, lent additional sup-
port to the argument that the Court had always been reluctant to disturb legislatively pre-
scribed criminal sentences. Id at 274.
119. Id. at 281. Rummel argued that the Court should compare his sentence with recidi-
vist schemes in other jurisdictions. Id at 279-80. He also maintained that his offenses were
all minor property offenses rather than violent crimes against the person. Id at 275. The
Court responded that there will always be one state that may be singled out for treating
particular offenders more harshly than any other state. Id. at 282.
120. Id. at 281. The Court did recognize a distinction between the Texas statute under
consideration in Rummel, and one which precluded the possibility of parole, when it argued
that "[i]f nothing else, the possibility of parole, however slim, serves to distinguish Rummel
from a person sentenced under a recidivist statute . . . which provides for a sentence of life
without parole." Id
19841
Catholic University Law Review
employing a comparative test. Justice Rehnquist stressed the important
state interest behind the statute,' 2 ' reasoning that it was not merely the
nature of the underlying offenses Rummel was asking the Court to assess,
but Texas' interest in deterring and punishing those who deviate from soci-
etal norms by habitually engaging in criminal activity.' 22 The Court as-
serted it had long recognized the danger of replacing legislative judgment
with the "subjective views of individual Justices."' 2 3 It maintained that
state legislatures are entitled to determine where the lines should be drawn
in fixing criminal penalties, 24 subject to those eighth amendment limita-
tions that can be objectively identified.'25 The Court, however, declined to
propose an objective test to guide lower courts faced with such challenges
in the future.
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent in Rummel, asserted that prior
Supreme Court holdings did not limit the application of proportionality
principles solely to death penalty cases.' 26 Moreover, he contended, the
Court erred in considering the possibility of parole as part of its evaluation
of the proportionality test outlined by Rummel.'2 7 Powell would have ex-
tended the proportionality concept found in prior Supreme Court cases to
Rummel's prison sentence, and applied a comparative test such as that
121. Id. at 276.
122. Id.
123. Id at 274 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592; see supra notes 44-52 and
accompanying text). The majority also cites in support of judicial restraint, Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912). In Graham, decided two years after Weems, a three-time
horse thief received a life sentence under West Virginia's recidivist statute. The Supreme
Court gave only cursory recognition to the eighth amendment claim, dismissing it in one
sentence as not cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 631. The Rummel dissent asserted
that Graham was not persuasive because it provided no analysis of the eighth amendment
issue, and because it was decided before the amendment was held applicable to the states
through incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 290 n.7 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting).
124. 445 U.S. at 275-76.
125. Id. at 284.
126. Id. at 292-93 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 293-94 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell prefaced his analysis by outlin-
ing the reasons for his dissent: "(i) the penalty for a noncapital offense may be unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate, (ii) the possibility of parole should not be considered in assessing
the nature of the punishment, (iii) a mandatory life sentence is grossly disproportionate as
applied to the petitioner, and (iv) the conclusion that this petitioner has suffered a violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights is compatible with principles of judicial restraint and feder-
alism." 1d. at 286-87. Justice Powell contended that a petitioner has no right to be paroled,
he will merely be eligible. In Powell's view, parole was thus no more than an act of execu-
tive grace. He noted that in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 42 U.S. 1 (1979), the
Court held "that a criminal conviction extinguishes whatever liberty interest a prisoner has
in securing freedom before the end of his lawful sentence." 1d. at 293.
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enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in Hart.'2 8
For the most part, lower federal courts interpreted the Rummel decision
as precluding judicial attempts to apply proportionality principles where a
term of imprisonment is imposed. 2 9 Some courts, however, were reluctant
to abandon proportionality analysis.' 3°
2. Lower Court Response.- Reading Rummel as Minimizing Judicial
Review
In United States v. Valenzuela, 13 Jose Guadalupe Valenzuela was given
a life sentence without prospect for parole following multiple convictions,
all of which arose from his participation in a major drug-dealing enter-
prise.' 32 He argued that his sentence violated the cruel and unusual pun-
ishments clause of the eighth amendment because it was grossly
disproportionate to his offense. 133 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit interpreted Rummel as "significantly limit[ing] the avail-
ability of Valenzuela's argument that his sentence is disproportionate to
the crime of which he was convicted."' 34 It noted that the Rummel deci-
sion precluded a proportionality challenge to a prison sentence in all but
the most extreme cases. 1 35 Furthermore, the court refused to accept
Valenzuela's argument that because his life sentence was without possibil-
ity of parole, it was akin to a sentence of death.'
36
Other federal courts have summarily rejected claims of disproportionate
punishment under the eighth amendment in a similar manner. Courts
128. Id. at 304-07. The Fourth Circuit in Hart relied on the rationale of earlier Supreme
Court cases in applying a proportionality test to a claim that a sentence for a term of years in
prison violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause. See supra notes 56-70 and ac-
companying text.
129. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text; see also The Supreme Court, 1979
Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75 (1980). (The author remarked that the eighth amendment's
"suspicion of legislative pronouncements extends to all punishments, yet Justice Rehnquist
simply immunized the whole class of cases involving prison sentences from constitutional
scrutiny."). Id at 495.
130. See, e.g., Hayes v. Bordenkircher, 621 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1980); see also infra notes
139-47 and accompanying text.
131. 646 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1980).
132. He was convicted of conspiracy, several counts of drug distribution and ongoing
criminal enterprise. It was the latter offense for which he received the life imprisonment
sentence. Id. at 353. The court stressed the gravity of the crime: Valenzuela was involved
in "a long-term, large-scale, highly profitable drug operation." Id at 354 n. 1.
133. Id at 354.
134. Id.
135. Id; see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
136. The court interpreted Supreme Court decisions as "never indicat[ing] that a life
sentence without parole is constitutionally different from other imprisonment sentences."
646 F.2d at 352.
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have dismissed with little or no analysis both claims in which the punish-
ment imposed was less severe than Rummel's and claims based on offenses
arguably more serious.' 37 Moreover, some courts have appeared less in-
clined to review prison sentences within statutorily defined limits, and
have cited Rummel in support for a finding that such sentences are virtu-
ally immune to a proportionality attack.
31
Some courts, however, have displayed considerable reluctance in dis-
carding the proportionality analysis articulated in Weems and Hart. In
Hayes v. Bordenkircher, 139 the Sixth Circuit continued to engage in a re-
view of sentences of imprisonment based on proportionality principles.' 4 °
Hayes was convicted of cashing a forged check under a recidivist statute in
effect at the time of his trial, but repealed before appellate review.' 4 1
Hayes' prior felonies included attempted rape and robbery. 42 The court
concluded that Rummel required the judiciary to refrain from second
guessing the determinations of state legislatures and courts. 4 3 It noted
that "Justice Rehnquist [writing for the majority in Rummel] concluded
that American citizens do not have an eighth amendment constitutional
right to have punishment proportionate to the severity of the crime.' 44
Nevertheless, the court discussed Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in
137. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86, 93 (5th Cir. 1982) (in light of Rum-
mel, a 40 year sentence for mail fraud prescribed by statute is not excessive); United States
v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 675 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Rummel decision puts into question whether
any sentence short of death for [serious] felony convictions. . . is cruel and unusual punish-
ment .... "); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 747, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1982) (in light of Rum-
mel, a sentence of 10- to 15-years for issuing an insufficient check for $40, possessing a
forged instrument in the amount of $40 and embezzling $433 is not unconstitutionally dis-
proportionate); Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980) (life sentence for rape is not
unconstitutionally disproportionate under Rummel rationale), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939
(1981).
138. For examples of cases finding punishments valid because within statutory limits, see
United States v. Compton, 704 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d
1371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1980).
139. 621 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1980).
140. For a discussion of prior Sixth Circuit cases arising under the cruel and unusual
punishments clause, see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
141. 621 F.2d at 847-48. Under the statute, Hayes received life imprisonment after three
felony convictions. The statute as revised would have changed one of his felony convictions,
uttering a forged instrument, to a misdemeanor. Additionally, the new statute provided that
a felony conviction would not be counted toward the requisite three convictions unless the
defendant actually served time in prison for it. Id at 849. Because Hayes had served time
for only two felony convictions, the court observed that "[hlad Mr. Hayes waited to utter the
forged instrument until after Kentucky modernized its recidivist statute, he would not now
be faced with the mandatory life imprisonment." Id at 850.
142. Id at 850.
143. Id at 849.
144. Id. at 848.
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Rummel and recounted the proportionality analysis he advanced.' 45 The
court, in dicta, concluded that even if it could permissibly review the pro-
portionality of Hayes' sentence, under Powell's analysis, life imprisonment
was not grossly disproportionate under the circumstances. 4 6 In view of
the seriousness of Hayes' prior offenses, the court refused to find his
mandatory life sentence disproportionate to the gravity of his crimes.'
47
Thus, though the Hayes court found Rummel to be dispositive, the opinion
suggested an unwillingness to completely abandon proportionality
principles.
Davis v. Davis,148 which generated a complex series of remands and ap-
peals, is particularly instructive. In Davis v. Davis, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed an eighth amendment claim
complicated by the intervention of the Pummel decision during the course
of appellate review. The case arose from a habeas corpus petition filed
before the United States Supreme Court decided Rummel.149 The District
Court for the Western District of Virginia invoked a Hart proportionality
test to invalidate Davis' sentence of forty years in prison and $20,000 in
fines for offenses involving possession and distribution of small amounts of
marijuana. 150 A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed.' 5 ' On rehearing en banc, however, this decision
145. Id at 849.
146. Id at 849-50. Similarly, in West Virginia, state courts have continued to adhere to
proportionality principles. In Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va.- 1981),
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia invoked a Hart proportionality test and
invalidated a habeas petitioner's life sentence. Id. at 211-14. Wanstreet was sentenced to
life imprisonment under West Virginia's recidivist statute. Id at 207. His prior convictions
included forging a check for $18.62 and arson (burning a barn). Id While on parole, he
was convicted for driving without a license and his parole was revoked. Id The offense
triggering the statute was forging a check for $43.00. Id The court construed West Vir-
ginia's constitution, which included a clause requiring that "[p]enalties shall be proportioned
to the character and degree of the offense." Id. at 206. The court recognized that Rummel
had restricted proportionality review under the United States Constitution. Id at 209-10.
Nonetheless, it maintained that "[wlhile the Eighth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution contains no such explicit statement of the proportionality principle, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the principle is implicit in its prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment." Id at 209.
147. 621 F.2d at 849-50.
148. 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981).
149. See Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977).
150. Id at 451-52. Hart, also decided in the Fourth Circuit, was considered by the dis-
trict court to represent the "prevailing law." Davis, 432 F. Supp. at 452. The court similarly
stressed the absence of violence associated with Davis' convictions, as the Fourth Circuit
had done previously in Griffin v, Warden. See supra note 70.
151. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978). The court stated that the Hart four-
pronged test was not mandatory, and that such a "broad inquiry" was not required where
the sentence was for a term of years, rather than life. Id at 1232.
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was vacated and the district court's holding was affirmed.152 The Supreme
Court vacated the en banc decision and remanded the case for reconsider-
ation in light of its recent decision in Rummel.'53 Upon remand, the
Fourth Circuit could not agree on the effect of the Rummel holding. 5 4 An
equally divided court affirmed the district court judgment. 155  The
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of the district
court opinion.16 The Court struck down the Fourth Circuit's proportion-
ality test, asserting that the court of appeals "failed to heed our decision in
Rummel."' 57 The Fourth Circuit, the Court stated, "could be viewed as
having ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal
court system created by the Constitution and Congress."' 58 The Court
found Davis' arguments indistinguishable from those advanced by Rum-
mel, and maintained that in Rummel, it clearly had rejected the applica-
tion of proportionality principles to claims of cruel and unusual
punishment involving only sentences of "excessive" imprisonment.5 9 The
Court maintained that proportionality analysis might properly be under-
taken with respect to capital punishment cases because the death penalty is
qualitatively different from all other forms of punishment.' 6°
152. 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The Fourth Circuit affirmed both the
district court's holding and rationale. The district court's holding rested on a finding that
Davis' sentence was disproportionate in light of the nonviolent nature of the crime. The
court employed a Hart proportionality test.
153. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980) (memorandum opinion).
154. 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
155. Id. at 124; see also Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
The Terrebonne court was divided on whether Rummel precluded further application of any
proportionality analysis. The majority found Rummel to be controlling, and determined
that if the sentence "serve[s] an obvious and substantial state interest," it does not violate the
cruel and unusual punishments clause. Id. at 1001-02. The minority argued that the pro-
portionality test was viable after Rummel. It contended that the Rummel Court merely
found the test to be inappropriate under the facts of that case. Moreover, the minority main-
tained that the Rummel Court in fact relied on a proportionality analysis. Id at 1004.
156. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
157. Id at 372.
158. Id at 374-75.
159. Id at 372-73.
160. Id. at 373. The Court's opinion was not joined by all members of the Court. Justice
Powell concurred only in the judgment, conceding that Davis' offenses could be viewed as
more serious than Rummel's, while Davis' sentence was less severe. Id. at 379-80 (Powell,
J., concurring in the judgment). Although he found Rummel to be controlling, Justice Pow-
ell nonetheless asserted that Davis' sentence was "unjust and disproportionate to the of-
fense." Id. at 375. Powell noted that the Virginia legislature, since Davis' conviction, had
reduced the maximum penalty for possession and distribution of marijuana to 10 years in
prison for each offense, which would be half the number of years Davis was serving. 1d. at
379. Justice Powell found a letter from the state prosecutor in Davis' case to be persuasive.
The letter urged suspension of Davis' sentence and expressed the belief that the sentence was
"grossly unjust." Id. at 377 n.7. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
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While members of the Supreme Court substantially disagreed on the
correctness of the Rummel holding, the lower court response was fairly
uniform. Because most lower courts interpreted Rummel as precluding,
other than in capital cases, judicial review of arguably disproportionate
punishment, the United States Supreme Court accepted an opportunity to
clarify the proper scope of proportionality review in Solem v. Helm. 6 '
II. SOLEM V HELM: EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF PROPORTIONALITY
ANALYSIS UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A. The Eighth Circuit's Anaysis. Circumventing Rummel
Jerry Helm was convicted under a South Dakota recidivist statute and
sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The facts in
Helm closely approximated those in Rummel. Helm's principal felony of-
fense was uttering a $100 "no account" check.'62 He had six previous fel-
ony convictions,' 63 which triggered a state recidivist statute 64 that
provided for a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. The trial
judge imposed a life sentence. Under South Dakota law, no prospect for
parole attached to sentences of life imprisonment, although commutation
of sentence was possible at the governor's discretion. 165 The Supreme
issued a strong dissent. Brennan insisted that Rummel was incorrectly decided. Id. at 382
(Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted that even if properly decided, Rummel did not preclude
the application of proportionality analysis to prison sentences. Id at 382-83. He contended
that because the Rummel Court recognized that a proportionality test would be appropriate
in rare cases, such as life imprisonment imposed for a parking violation, Rummel did not
preclude invocation of proportionality analysis in Davis. Id at 383 n.l. Justice Brennan
maintained that the "general principle of deference ... cannot justify the complete abdica-
tion of our responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment." Id at 383. Justice Brennan
was disturbed that the Court had summarily disposed of Davis' case without hearing oral
argument or receiving a complete briefing. Id at 381.
161. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
162. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 582 (8th Cir. 1982), aft'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
163. Id. His six prior convictions included three convictions for third degree burglary,
and convictions for drunk driving, grand larceny, and obtaining money by false pretenses.
Id. at n.2.
164. Under South Dakota law, when a person was convicted of a fourth felony, the sen-
tencing judge could impose the punishment available for a "Class I" felony. The maximum
penalty for a Class I felony was life imprisonment. Id at 582 n.2.
165. Id at 583. The Governor may choose to commute the sentence, pursuant to a rec-
ommendation from the board. The relevant South Dakota law provided: "[tihe Governor
may, by executive order, delegate to the board of pardons and paroles the authority to hear
applications for pardon, commutation, reprieve, or remission of fines and forfeitures, and to
make its recommendations to him." State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 499 n.1 (S.D. 1980).
"The Governor is not bound to follow a recommendation returned by the board." Id at 499
n.2.
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Court of South Dakota affirmed the sentence,' 6 6 finding that it was within
the permissible statutory limits 6 7 and therefore did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Helm's petition for writ of habeas corpus was
denied without hearing by the United States District Court for the District
of South Dakota, 6 ' and he appealed. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 169 concluding that Helm's punishment was
so disproportionate in relation to his underlying offenses as to be cruel and
unusual. 70
The Eighth Circuit distinguished Rummel by noting that under the
Texas recidivist statute, Rummel would have been eligible for parole.'
In the court's view, this fact was material to the Rummel Court's hold-
ing.' 72 The Eighth Circuit maintained that, like the death penalty, a life
sentence without parole "totally rejects rehabilitation as a basic goal of our
criminal justice system"'73 and is therefore different "in kind" from life
imprisonment with a possibility of parole.' 74 The court contended that its
analysis was consistent with Rummel because the Rummel majority had
conceded that rare situations might arise which present cognizable claims
outside the context of capital punishment.' Reasoning that a life sen-
tence under the South Dakota statute was manifestly different from the
sentence upheld in Rummel because it precluded all possibility of parole,
the court invoked a comparative test employing "objective criteria" to de-
termine whether the sentence was commensurate with Helm's crimes. 176
Because the court found the crimes to be nonviolent' and the punish-
ment to be substantially more severe than would be imposed in nearly all
166. 287 N.W.2d at 499.
167. Id. at 498. Three Justices comprised the majority. Two Justices dissented; they
would have held that, although it was the policy of South Dakota courts to defer to legisla-
tive judgments unless a penalty "should shock the conscience of the court," there are in-
stances, though rare, where in the interest of justice, departure from this precedent is
mandated. Id. at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
168. Helm v. Solem, No. 81-5148 (D.S.D. Dec. 12, 1981).
169. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
170. Id. at 587.
171. See supra notes 120, 125-27 and accompanying text.
172. 684 F.2d at 584, 585 n.5.
173. Id. at 585.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 585 n.6. The court noted that the Rummel majority recognized a proportion-
ality test would be appropriate in an extraordinary situation. See supra note 105 and accom-
panying text.
176. The court maintained that neither Rummel nor Davis had addressed the exact ques-
tion presented by Helm because both Rummel and Davis were eligible for parole. The
Court employed the three-part test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Coker. See supra
notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
177. 684 F.2d at 586.
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other jurisdictions,' it determined that Helm's life sentence without pa-
role violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishments. The United States Supreme Court, in a decision written
by Justice Powell, affirmed.1
79
B. The Supreme Court's Rationale." Justifying a Return to Equitable
Considerations
Justice Powell prefaced his analysis with an historical review of the cruel
and unusual punishments clause and its judicial application. He noted
that the concept of proportionality of sentences originated in the Magna
Carta, in which "three chapters. . . were devoted to the rule that 'amerce-
ments' may not be excessive."' 80 Powell contended that the Court had
long recognized the proportionality principle, from its earliest application
in Weems 8' to its most recent invocation in the death penalty cases.' 82 He
reasoned that since the punishment of a fine and the death penalty were
both subject to proportionality analysis, a sentence of imprisonment
should also bear a reasonable relationship to the underlying offense.' 83 He
noted that no United States Supreme Court decision had ever excluded
terms of years in prison from the requirement of proportionality. 84 The
Powell Court thus expressly expanded the application of proportionality
analysis under the eighth amendment to include Helm's sentence and held
"as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to
the crime for which the defendant has been convicted."'
' 85
The majority opinion in Helm was shaped by equitable considerations.
The Court was particularly concerned with the rigid approach to eighth
amendment analysis adopted by many courts.' 86 The Court noted that
historically it had advocated a flexible method of analyzing cases arising
178. Id. at 587.
179. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion
in Rummel. Like Rummel, Helm was a five to four decision. Joining the majority opinion
were Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun (who subscribed to the majority opinion in
Rummel), and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger dissented; he was joined by Justices White,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
180. Id. at 3006.
181. Id. at 3007-08. He also cited with approval Justice Field's dissenting opinion in
O'Neill v. Vermont. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
182. 103 S. Ct. at 3008.
183. Id at 3009.
184. Id. Although it has recognized the unique quality of the death sentence, the Court
noted that it has never "drawn a distinction with cases of imprisonment." Id
185. Id.
186. Id. at 3010. The Court attempted to establish guidelines for use by lower courts in
adjudicating eighth amendment claims.
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under the cruel and unusual punishments clause.' 87 It also pointed to the
absence of any rehabilitative purpose in the imposition of a life term with-
out possibility of parole on a repeat offender whose habitual criminal ac-
tivity was largely the product of alcoholism.'
88
The Court necessarily assumed a defensive posture. Since it apparently
was unwilling to overrule Rummel, the Court was required to engage in
extended analysis in an attempt to distinguish Helm from Rummel and
Davis. In the Court's view, its holding in Helm flowed logically from its
pre-Rummel opinions.' 89 The Helm Court stressed that its holding did not
mandate extensive appellate review of all prison sentences. Courts were
still obligated to "grant substantial deference" to legislative judgment and
trial court determinations when undertaking an assessment of proportion-
ality. ' ° Such deference, however, should not preclude judicial inquiry in
those cases where a sentence may be so disproportionate as to raise a legiti-
mate eighth amendment claim.' 9 ' The inquiry should apply "objective
factors" that have aided courts in the past in determining whether a pun-
ishment is excessive in relation to the offense.' 92 The Court suggested that
relevant criteria comprising an objective analysis of a given punishment
would include an assessment of the gravity of the offense in relation to the
severity of the punishment, a comparison of the punishment with sentences
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime, and a comparison of the
punishment with other criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdic-
tion.193 The Court observed that in Weems it had applied a comparative
test' 9 4 in determining that the imposition of "cadena temporal" was not
only disproportionate to the gravity of Weems' offense, but also unique to
187. Id at 3007-08.
188. Id at 3005, 3013 n.22. Helm argued that his felonies "involved nonviolent crimes
and were due to a severe drinking problem." 287 N.W.2d at 498. The Eighth Circuit had
emphasized that "[a]lthough Helm's alcoholism does not excuse his failure to bring his con-
duct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law, it is nonetheless a condition
amenable to treatment." 684 F.2d at 587.
189. 103 S. Ct. at 3008-10. The Court conceded that death is qualitatively different from
other punishments, and that "outside the context of capital punishment, successful chal-
lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare." Id. (empha-
sis in original) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 272). This distinction did not mean,
however, that there would never be successful challenges when prison terms were attacked
as cruel and unusual. Id at 3009.
190. Id at 3009 n. 16. Appellate court review should only consider whether a given sen-
tence is within the bounds of "constitutional limits."
191. See id. at 3009-10.
192. Id. at 3010. The Court maintained that no single factor will be determinative. Id.
at n.17.
193. Id at 3011.
194. Id at 3010. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
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the Philippine jurisdiction. Additionally, the Weems Court had examined
the punishments imposed in the Philippines for more serious offenses'
95
and concluded that in light of Weems' offense, the punishment imposed
was excessive.
196
The Court further observed that in Robinson, where it had invalidated a
ninety-day prison sentence as cruel and unusual punishment for drug ad-
diction, there had been no challenge to the mode of punishment. 97 The
issue presented in Robinson was whether imprisonment was excessive in
relation to the offense.' 98 Therefore, in the Helm Court's view, Robinson
supported the application of proportionality principles to cases in which
neither the death penalty, nor a particular method of punishment, were at
issue. More recently, in Coker, the Court employed a proportionality
analysis that relied on objective factors similar to those now advanced by
Helm.' 99 The Coker Court, relying on Weems for authority,2" used a
comparative test to determine whether the punishment of death was exces-
sive in relation to the offense.2"' The Court determined that the crime of
rape did not warrant the imposition of the death penalty which normally
was imposed only where a life had been taken.2°2
Thus, while the Court had never invalidated a prison sentence solely on
the basis of excessive length,20 3 the Helm majority observed that neither
had the Court expressly determined that sentences of imprisonment were
excepted from proportionality analysis. 2° On the contrary, the Court
noted that when it had applied proportionality principles in capital cases,
it had not drawn a distinction with cases involving prison sentences.20 5
195. Id.
196. Id. at 3008.
197. Id. at 3008. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
198. Id.; see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
199. Id; see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
200. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
201. 103 S. Ct. at 3010. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592-93. Similarly in Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982), the Court employed the same proportionality analysis and determined
that death was disproportionate punishment for felony murder. See supra note 52.
202. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
203. In Robinson, the Court did not address whether the length of the prison sentence
was excessive. The Robinson Court had focused on the nature of the offense, and whether
any prison sentence would be appropriate. The language employed in Robinson, however,
suggested that a prison sentence could be excessive in its duration. See supra notes 36-42
and accompanying text.
204. 103 S. Ct. at 3009. Indeed, even Rummel and Davis specifically noted that in some
circumstances prison sentences could violate the eighth amendment. See supra note 105.
205. 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
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C. Adopting the Expansive View. Applying a Three-Part Proportionality
test to Prison Sentences
Borrowing the rationale applied in prior Supreme Court cases,2 °6 the
Helm majority proposed a three-part proportionality test. The Court con-
cluded that relevant factors to be considered included: (1) the nature of
the offense and the severity of the punishment; (2) the penalties prescribed
in the same jurisdiction for other, more serious, offenses; and (3) the pun-
ishment imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime. 0 7 The Court
acknowledged that assessing the gravity of the offense and the severity of
the penalty raises the danger of interjecting the subjective views of
judges.20 8 It thus devoted a portion of its discussion to defending judicial
competence to make this determination. 2 9 The Court maintained that in
weighing the nature of the offense, "[clomparisons can be made in light of
the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability
of the offender. '' 1 ° Recognizing that comparing prison terms is substan-
tially more difficult than comparing the death penalty with other modes of
punishment, the Court contended that such "line-drawing" was not un-
known to the courts, which have adequately addressed such complex issues
in other contexts while maintaining the integrity of the federal system of
government. 211 Justice Powell then applied a three-pronged proportional-
ity test to the circumstances of Jerry Helm's sentence and concluded that
206. Id at 3010-11. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (nature of the
crime), see supra note 52; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(seriousness of crime), see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text; Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (nature of crime), see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text;
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (pettiness of offense), see supra notes 17-32 and
accompanying text.
207. 103 S. Ct. at 3010-11.
208. See id at 3011.
209. Id. at 3010-11.
210. Id at 3011. For example, the Court suggested that this analysis include, if appro-
priate, whether the crime committed was violent or nonviolent, whether the crime was
against a person or property, whether the offense was a lesser included offense, and the value
of the property if a property offense. Id.
211. Id. at 3011-12. In illustration, the Court pointed out that pursuant to sixth amend-
ment rights to a speedy trial and trial by jury, courts have engaged successfully in line-
drawing. The Court referred to cases involving the right to a speedy trial, which "identified
some of the objective factors that courts should consider in determining whether a particular
delay [is] excessive." Id at 3012. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). In
Barker, a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that the determination was best made
within the context of each case by employing a balancing test. The Court noted that such an
approach "necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis."
Id. at 530. The factors identified by the Court included: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) any
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the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment.
First, in focusing on the nature of the crime, the majority determined
that the offenses committed by Helm were relatively minor. Helm's most
recent crime was neither violent nor potentially violent.212 Moreover, the
Court noted that the amount of the "no account" check was so insubstan-
tial that had Helm stolen the money he would have been guilty only of a
misdemeanor.213 Because Helm was convicted as an habitual offender, the
Court examined all of his prior convictions and noted that they were non-
violent as well. 21" Turning to the severity of the punishment, the Court
adopted the Eighth Circuit's finding that Helm's sentence was harsher than
Rummel's life sentence because Helm would be ineligible for parole.
2 5
Second, in comparing Helm's sentence to those prescribed for graver of-
fenses, the Court observed that life imprisonment without parole was nor-
mally reserved for the most heinous crimes. 216 Third, when the Court
compared Helm's sentence with those imposed in other jurisdictions, it ob-
served that in virtually any other state Helm would have received a less
prejudice to the defendant. Id The Court recognized that the determination involved a
"difficult and sensitive balancing process." Id. at 533.
Additionally, the constitutional right to a trial by jury has necessitated judicial line-draw-
ing, as the Court's decision demonstrates in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (plu-
rality opinion). Because "petty" offenses were generally not considered to require a jury
trial, the Court had to determine what constitutes a petty, as opposed to a serious offense for
the purpose of trial by jury. The plurality adopted a flexible approach, noting that in the
past the Court had "sought objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society
regards the offense." Id at 68. It was appropriate to examine "the existing laws and prac-
tices of the nation." Id at 70 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968)). The
Court compared the practices in various jurisdictions and observed that the "near uniform
judgment of the nation furnishes us with the only objective criteria by which a line could
ever be drawn." Id. at 72. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Baldwin, maintained that
"what may be a serious offense in one setting... may be considered less serious in another
area, and the procedures for finding guilt and fixing punishment in the two locales may
rationally differ from each other." Id. at 77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
212. 103 S. Ct. at 3012.
213. Id. at 3012-13.
214. Id at 3013.
215. Id.
216. Id at 3013-14. The South Dakota statute imposes mandatory life sentences for
"murder, and on a second or third conviction for treason, first degree manslaughter, first
degree arson, and kidnapping." Id. at 3014. Life sentences are discretionary on the second
or third conviction for attempted murder, placing explosives on aircraft, and first degree
rape. Id. In the majority's view, Helm's crimes were relatively minor. See infra note 241.
Moreover, the Court distinguished Rummel by determining that the possibility of commuta-
tion is not commensurate with a system of parole. 103 S. Ct. at 3015. The Court stated that
parole "is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases." 1d. "Commutation, on the
other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency." 1d. Helm had in fact requested
commutation and was denied. Id at 3016 n.29.
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severe punishment.2" 7 The Court concluded that Helm's sentence was
"significantly disproportionate to his crime" and therefore violated the
eighth amendment.218
The dissenting opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, asserted that
the Court's "holding cannot rationally be reconciled with Rummel."2 19
The dissent noted that the objective test proposed by Helm and adopted by
the Court was identical to the test rejected by the Rummel Court.22° Simi-
larly, the Court had rejected Rummel's argument that Weems and the
death penalty cases required a proportionality assessment of his punish-
ment, yet it embraced the same proposition when it was advanced by
Helm.2 2 ' In the dissent's view, extending proportionality review to Helm's
sentence was a "bald substitution of individual subjective moral values for
those of the legislature." '222 Chief Justice Burger asserted that the essen-
tially arbitrary lines between various sentences of imprisonment under
proportionality analysis must be drawn by the legislature. The Court's
holding, therefore, was tantamount to a transgression of the traditional
role of the judiciary in the federal system.22 3 According to the dissent, the
Court's rationale that life imprisonment without possibility of parole pro-
217. Id. at 3014-15. The only state in which Helm could have received a similar sentence
was Nevada, and the Court noted that it did not appear that the Nevada statute had ever
been applied to offenses as trivial as Helm's.
218. Id at 3016. Interestingly, the test had previously been articulated by the Court as
"grossly disproportionate" rather than "significantly." See supra note 47.
219. 103 S. Ct. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
220. Burger noted that the Court had rejected Rummel's proposed distinction between
serious or violent crimes and petty nonviolent offenses for the reason that the absence or
presence of violence does not always indicate the degree of society's interest in punishing the
offender. Id at 3019. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76. The dissent asserted that the second
prong of Rummel's test, requiring his sentence to be compared with sentences imposed for
the same offense in other jurisdictions, invited speculation on the motives of state legisla-
tures and thus threatened fundamental concepts of federalism. 103 S. Ct. at 3019. This
comparison was rendered more difficult by the fact that both Rummel and Helm involved
consideration of recidivist statutes. Id. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-81. The third objective
factor urged by Rummel, that his sentence be compared with criminal penalties imposed in
the same jurisdiction for other crimes, was also rejected by the Rummel Court. The Court
had determined that such a comparison was "inherently speculative." 103 S. Ct. at 3019.
See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282.
221. 103 S. Ct. at 3017-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Rummel Court had emphasized
the "bright line" that could be drawn between bizarre punishments such as that suffered by
Weems, and traditional criminal sanctions. It was also possible to draw a line between the
ultimate sanction of death and any other punishment. Id at 3019. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at
275.
222. 103 S. Ct. at 3022 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 3019. The dissent pointed out that certain crimes may be deemed more seri-




vided a valid basis for distinguishing Rummel was without merit.2 2 4
The dissent maintained that if Rummel had left unanswered questions
concerning the proper scope of proportionality review, such questions were
conclusively resolved by Davis.225 The dissent reasoned that the Rummel
and Davis decisions were consistent with the "prevailing view" that the
eighth amendment "reaches only the mode of punishment and not the
length of imprisonment." '226 Chief Justice Burger predicted that by ex-
tending proportionality review to sentences such as Helm's, the Court's
holding would result in flooding the appellate courts with claims of dispro-
portionate punishment.227
. An Undeclared Overruling of Rummel v. Estelle?
In holding that a proportionality review of Helm's sentence was re-
quired by the Constitution,228 the Court clearly expanded judicial review
in eighth amendment cases well beyond the scope contemplated by the
Rummel Court. Nevertheless, the Helm Court, in a strained reading of its
recent Rummel decision, concluded that the two cases could be reconciled.
224. Id at 3023. The dissent maintained that because a sentence of death is irrevocable,
there is need for greater reliability. In Chief Justice Burger's view, however, heightened
judicial scrutiny is not justified where a prison sentence is involved, whether or not there is
potential for parole. Id. at 3021 n.4.
225. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
226. 103 S. Ct. at 3021 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
227. Id at 3022. The dissent maintained that the Court's holding provided no guidance
for lower courts faced with eighth amendment claims of disproportionate prison sentences.
Chief Justice Burger inquired "[t]oday [the Court] holds that a sentence of life imprison-
ment, without possibility of parole, is excessive punishment for a seventh 'non-violent' fel-
ony. How about the eighth 'non-violent' felony? The ninth? The twelfth?" Id
228. Id. at 3016. The constitutional requirement that the punishment be proportionate
to the crime, as determined by the Helm Court, is distinct from a requirement that courts
undertake extended comparative analysis in every case.
In Pulley v. Harris, 52 U.S.L.W. 4140 (Jan. 23, 1984), the Supreme Court addressed
whether courts reviewing a capital sentence must compare the sentence imposed with penal-
ties imposed in all similar cases. Id at 4142. According to the Court, the proportionality
review sought
presumes that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the crime in the tradi-
tional sense . . . . The issue in this case . . . is whether the Eighth Amendment
• ..requires a state appellate court, before it affirms a death sentence, to compare
the sentence in the case before it with the penalties imposed in similar cases if
requested to do so by the prisoner. Harris insists that it does and that this is the
invariable rule in every case. . . . We do not agree.
Id. at 4143. The Court emphasized that the statute under which Harris was sentenced pro-
vided adequate constitutional protections. Id at 4145. It declined to address the question
whether "there could be a capital sentencing system so lacking in other checks on arbitrari-
ness that it would not pass constitutional muster without comparative proportionality re-
view." Id.
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Rummel, the Court maintained, "should not be read to foreclose propor-
tionality review of sentences of imprisonment."229 This determination,
however, clearly distorts both the holding and the underlying rationale of
Rummel.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Helm stated that the Court's holding
was completely at odds with Rummel.23 ° This assertion has a great deal of
merit, especially since the Court's conclusion in Helm turned largely on
the fact that Helm's sentence precluded any possibility of parole. While
past Supreme Court cases have, as the majority noted, 23' recognized a sub-
stantive difference between parole and commutation in other contexts,
232
the Helm Court couched its analysis in far broader language. It held that
proportionality, as embodied in the cruel and unusual punishments clause
of the eighth amendment, not only applied to sentences of imprisonment,
but was required by the Constitution.233 Moreover, Justice Powell, in his
dissenting opinion in Rummel, had expressly stated that the possibility of
parole should not be a factor in a court's attempt to assess the proportion-
ality of a given punishment.234 In Helm, Justice Powell's majority opinion
purported to distinguish Rummel on the ground that Helm would never be
eligible for parole, thus suggesting that a life sentence without possibility
229. Id. at 3016 n.2. The Court maintained that Rummel rejected a proportionality ap-
proach under the facts of Rummel, but since the Rummel Court "offer[ed] no standards for
determining when an eighth amendment violation had occurred; it is controlling only in a
similar fact situation." Id
230. 103 S. Ct. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 3015.
232. See, e.g., Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschsat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981). In
Dumschsat, a prisoner was denied commutation of his sentence in a state where three-
fourths of the sentences were commuted, and he claimed the denial violated the fourteenth
amendment. The Court recognized a "vast difference" between parole and commutation,
but its rationale was based on the fact that there are different provisions in state statutes.
The Court reasoned that a statistical probability of clemency does not, by itself, create a
constitutional right. "The ground for a constitutional claim ... must be found in statutes or
other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged in exercising clemency." id at
465; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), in which the petitioners claimed
parole revocation without a hearing violated their due process rights. Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, observed that "the practice of releasing prisoners before the end of
their sentences has become an integral part of the penological system. Rather than being an
adhoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted
criminals." Id at 477. The Court noted that systems of parole vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
233. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3016. The Powell majority contended that "[tihe common law
principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment clearly applied to prison terms." Id at
3009. In support of this contention, Powell cited the English case Hodges v. Humkin, 2
Bulst. 139, 140 (K.R. 1615), in which that court had maintained "imprisonment ought al-
ways to be according to the quality of the offense." 103 S. Ct. at 3007.
234. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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of parole is qualitatively different from a prison sentence for a term of
years, or life imprisonment with parole. In making this distinction, the
Court seemed to accept the very premise it rejected in Rummel: that such
imprisonment is akin to a sentence of death. This attempt to reconcile the
two cases may have opened the door for the Court to expand explicitly the
proportionality concept, but it is doubtful that such a distinction is truly
defensible. The death penalty is, after all, completely irrevocable, and
even a life sentence without possibility of parole may be commuted, or the
offender pardoned. Justice Powell noted that parole is the "normal expec-
tation" in most cases of imprisonment, 235 and commutation is merely an
"ad hoc exercise of clemency. 236  Indeed, this normal expectation
prompted the Rummel majority to take parole possibilities into account
when it addressed whether Rummel's life sentence was disproportionate to
his offenses. 2 37 However, as Powell observed in his dissenting opinion in
Rummel, one does not have a right to parole.238
The Helm Court sought to achieve an equitable end through strained
reasoning. By distinguishing Rummel on the parole issue, the Court justi-
fied the invocation of a proportionality test to determine whether Helm's
severe sentence was "fair" in relation to his crimes and thus undermined
seriously the continued viability of Rummel. Applying this test, the Court
concluded that Helm's sentence was sufficiently "disproportionate" to trig-
ger eighth amendment protections.239 On closer scrutiny, however, the cir-
cumstances surrounding Helm's felony convictions do not establish
grounds for such a distinction. As the dissent pointed out, "[bly compari-
son [to Helm], Rummel was a relatively 'model citizen.' -240 Rummel's
three convictions were not only fewer in number but were clearly less seri-
ous than Helm's. 241' There is much to be said in equity for the majority's
conclusion in Helm, and it finds substantial support in Supreme Court pre-
235. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3015.
236. Id.
237. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281.
238. Id. at 293. See supra note 127.
239. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3016.
240. Id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
241. Rummel's three convictions included fraudulent use of a credit card, passing a
forged check, and obtaining money by false pretenses. Helm's seven convictions included
third degree burglary, grand larceny, driving while intoxicated, and obtaining money under
false pretenses. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d at 582 n.l (8th Cir. 1982). Justice Powell does
observe, however, that "there was no minimum amount in either the burglary or the false
pretenses statutes . . . and the minimum amount covered by the grand larceny statute was
fairly small." Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3013. "[T]he third degree burglary statute covered enter-
ing a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. It appears that the grand larceny
statute would have covered the theft of a chicken." Id at 3013 n.23; see id. at 3004 nn. 1-3.
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cedent as well as circuit court interpretations, but it cannot be rationally
reconciled with Rummel.242
The Burger dissent misreads precedent, however, in contending "the
Court blithely discards any concept of stare decisis, trespasses gravely on
the authority of the States, and distorts the concept of proportionality of
punishment by tearing it from its moorings in capital cases."2 43 A close
reading of the capital cases does not support Burger's view that propor-
tionality analysis has been confined exclusively by the Court to the imposi-
tion of the death penalty. Although the capital punishment cases
recognized a qualitative difference between a penalty of death, "irrevoca-
ble in its finality,' '244 and other forms of punishment, they did not ex-
pressly limit proportionality analysis to capital punishment. Further, no
decision, other than Rummel and Davis, can be read to preclude applica-
tion of such an analysis to prison sentences.245 Until Helm, the Court had
left open the question of whether the principle of proportionality recog-
nized in other cases could be applied to invalidate prison sentences exces-
sive in length.246 This uncertainty was evident in the disparate views of
lower courts on this issue.247 The analyses employed in Supreme Court
cases prior to Rummel support the Helm majority's view that the cruel and
unusual punishments clause prohibits any punishment that is significantly
disproportionate in relation to the gravity of the offense. Rather than re-
242. Indeed, review of federal court decisions issued since Helm reveals the difficulty
encountered by those courts in attempting to reconcile the two cases. Within a few months
after Helm, there was evidence of diverse response from lower courts. In United States v.
Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1983), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit accepted the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Helm between a life sen-
tence that offered the defendant a possibility of parole and one that did not. Id. at 1341 n.2.
In Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 567 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Idaho 1983), a district court discussed
the Helm proportionality test but determined that Schwartzmiller's sentence of slightly over
eleven years, imposed for committing lewd and lascivious acts with a minor, was commensu-
rate with punishments meted out in several other jurisdictions. Id at 1381. The court also
reasoned that the state legislature had rationally determined that Schwartzmiller's crime was
relatively serious. Id The court thus concluded that the sentence was not disproportionate
to the offenses.
243. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
244. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 165-66 (plurality
opinion)).
245. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
246. Rummel left open the possibility, albeit remote, that under extraordinary circum-
stances a prison sentence might violate the eighth amendment on the basis of its excessive
length. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423
U.S. 993 (1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973); Smith v. United States, 273




stricting the scope of the cruel and unusual punishments clause, United
States Supreme Court decisions prior to Rummel adopted a broad, flexible
view of its application, dependent upon factual circumstances. Excluding
the capital cases, the Court has stressed the flexibility of eighth amendment
analysis and has refused to pin down the scope of the amendment in any
prior opinions.248 It has emphasized that the amendment's proscriptions
should be viewed in light of "evolving standards of decency., 249 Viewed
in this manner, the conclusion of the Helm dissent, that precedent prevents
the application of eighth amendment protections to excessive prison
sentences, lacks substance.
In view of the historical background of the amendment, it is Rummel,
rather than Helm, that appears to be anomalous. As the Helm Court
noted, "[t]he principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the
crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurispru-
dence."25° Rummel and Davis were the first cases to impose expressly a
substantive limitation on the scope of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause. It is likely, therefore, that the Helm Court sought to restrict the
scope of those decisions, and though the circumstances in Helm were not
ideal,25' they provided a vehicle for the Court to retreat from its recent
narrow interpretation of the eighth amendment.
In a practical sense, the three-pronged test set forth by the Helm major-
ity is not without its flaws. Courts, in comparing punishments imposed in
various jurisdictions for the same crime, must take into consideration the
peculiar factors present in a given state or locality, for, as the dissent ob-
serves, horse thievery in Texas might be a far more serious crime than the
same offense would be in Rhode Island.252 Marijuana trafficking is likely
to pose special problems for Texas, New York, and other states that en-
counter large scale drug dealing operations. 2" An inquiry into the legiti-
mate goals sought to be achieved by particular legislation necessitates a
consideration of all such relevant circumstances, so that a court can cor-
rectly ascertain the "nature" of the crime for which a given penalty is im-
posed. The task is not an impossible one; it has been undertaken
248. See supra note 35.
249. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1955). See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
250. 103 S. Ct. at 3006.
25 1. As the Helm dissent correctly pointed out, Helm's seven felony offenses were "far
more severe than Rummel's three." 103 S. Ct. at 3020 n.2. See supra note 241.
252. Id at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
253. For a discussion of these regional discrepancies in asessing the nature of the offense,
see Note, supra note 30, at 1142; see also Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 109 (1979); see supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
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successfully in a variety of contexts,254 and the Helm dissent offered no
persuasive reason why it cannot be undertaken with respect to prison
sentences.
The dissent in Helm also maintained that the holding "trespasses
gravely on the authority of the States.,2 55 However, many eighth amend-
ment claims do not attack the facial validity of statutes, only their applica-
tion to particular facts.256 A statute that provides for life imprisonment for
three felony convictions could conceivably give rise to the imposition of a
life sentence on an individual convicted three times for writing bad checks,
if that offense is a felony in the jurisdiction. A life sentence for such an
offense may never have been contemplated by the legislators who enacted
the statute.257
The eighth amendment protects individuals against the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishments by the states as well as the federal govern-
ment. As the Helm majority aptly observed, "[n]o penalty isper se consti-
tutional. ' 25 ' Federalism problems arise whenever a court must rule on the
constitutionality of a state legislative enactment, but these problems can be
minimized if courts employ objective criteria in analyzing constitutional
claims. The three-part test articulated by the Court provides guidelines for
state and federal courts to observe in making a determination of propor-
tionality. In many cases, an eighth amendment claim attacking a prison
sentence will require only the most cursory review by a court before a
finding of constitutionality is made.259 Frivolous challenges need not con-
sume the time of the court. Where a claim raises genuine issues of "cruel
and unusual punishment," courts applying a proportionality test will,
under the Helm ruling, have the opportunity and the means for discover-
ing and remedying the defect.
254. See supra note 211.
255. 103 S. Ct. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
256. See, e.g., Hart, 483 F.2d at 138; see supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text; see
also supra notes 104-28 for a discussion of Rummel v. Esielle.
257. Moreover, requiring proportionality of prison sentences will not necessarily result in
reversal of state court judgments. As Justice Powell pointed out in his Rummel dissent, the
Fourth Circuit, since its decision in Hart, had only twice invalidated prison sentences as
disproportionate under the cruel and unusual punishments clause. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 304
(Powell, J., dissenting). In Justice Powell's view, the Fourth Circuit's experience was "evi-
dence that federal courts are capable of applying the Eighth Amendment to disproportionate
noncapital sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to principles of federalism and state
autonomy." Id. at 306; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
258. 103 S. Ct. at 3009-10.




Until the Supreme Court decided Solem v. Helm, the Court had never
expressly determined whether the eighth amendment's prohibitions ex-
tended to sentences of imprisonment excessive in duration. The holding in
Helm extended proportionality concepts expressly to life imprisonment
without parole and impliedly to excessive prison sentences. The history of
the Supreme Court's treatment of the eighth amendment's "cruel and unu-
sual punishments" clause permits the Helm Court's conclusion that pun-
ishment should be proportionate to the offense committed, regardless of
the mode of punishment. The decision is firmly rooted in equitable con-
siderations. Helm cannot, however, rationally be reconciled with the
Supreme Court's three-year old Rummel decision. As lower courts are
faced with future challenges to prison sentences, they will be forced to con-
sider both Rummel and Helm and attempt to determine the boundary be-
tween the two.
Additionally, practical problems may arise in making the necessary fac-
tual determinations under Helm: "drawing the line" between constitution-
ally permissible sentences and those that violate the cruel and unusual
punishments clause. It is uncertain after Helm whether life imprisonment
for a third, fourth, seventh, or tenth nonviolent felony violates the eighth
amendment. Moreover, while life imprisonment imposed for overtime
parking would clearly be cruel and unusual, sentences imposed for other
types of offenses may be more difficult to evaluate. It will be the .close
cases that require the indepth analysis of courts, not the cases that clearly
fall within conventional experience. Courts have exhibited competence,
however, at making such difficult factual determinations. The proportion-
ality test articulated in Helm will assist courts in making more objective,
less arbitrary, determinations under the eighth amendment and will serve
to promote the equitable concerns that prompted the amendment's
passage.
Nancy Keir
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